future and a practical ingredient of nation-building. It is not the world of imperialism against which socialism promised national liberation and autonomy. Neither is it the world of the Cold War, which pitted capitalism against socialist efforts to keep it at a distance. It is the world of a global capitalism that is willing to accommodate socialism as long as it plays by the rules of capitalism. And it is a world in which the meaning of capitalism itself is sufficiently blurred to allow self-professed socialists a modicum of ideological self-respect in their claims to socialist commitments even as the societies they lead are progressively reshaped by the forces of capitalism. Whether or not the accumulating crisis of global capitalism will once again inject vitality into this socialism remains to be seen. If so, it is likely to be socialism of a different kind from the one that was born of the struggles of a century or more of imperialism, nation-building and Euro/American cultural hegemony.
The changes of the ideological context of Chinese Marxism in the early 21 st century, which Dirlik locates within the larger centennial framework of socialist ideological development starting in earnest during the early 20 th century, 2 are undeniable, but the nature of "global capitalism" he refers to above has also been changing and demonstrating that its greedy reach is neither truly global nor always expressed in its most inhumane and harshest form. Post-Enlightenment Europe. 5 That is to say, they have accepted these values as their own, as contemporary Chinese values, indicating at the same time that they want to be/become modern, independent, economically stable and educationally informed persons.
What this has meant for persons involved in Chinese philosophical circles within contemporary mainland China is worthy of further exploration. We will approach this discussion by a less direct route. First, an account of the emergence of post-secularity within the last two decades within a larger international context will be 
II. The Emergence of Post-secularity in International Contexts
The academic turn which a number of contemporary scholars within China and elsewhere are making in relation to the vitality of religious traditions in the late 20 th and early 21st century has been described by the noted American sociologist, Peter
Berger, as a "desecularization" process. 7 Notably, Berger's shift has been followed by Chinese sociologists 8 through Chinese translations of some of his key works, but in a manner which is selective and not fully representative.
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Regarding the general nature of the post-secular interpretive trends to be described in the following section, the basic justification for their existence rests on an understanding of the de-secularization processes evident in contemporary societies including the PRC. Another major point which should be highlighted is that the Berger and
Zijderveld argue that modernity leads to a set of beliefs and values that support "plurality". The choice of words here is self-conscious and precise: they are not promoting a "pluralism" (which in normally rendered in Chinese as duoyuanhua 多元 化). Notably in their work they are concerned to oppose a radical form of epistemological relativism, arguing that this doctrinaire form of skepticism easily becomes absolutized. Instead, they persistently seek to argue for a form of moral certitude based upon universalizeable rational claims related to the nature of humans and their inherent dignity. They go on to argue that this approach to moral certitude allows for a "healthy form of doubt", meaning not a principled skepticism, but an empirical openness to new questions which will allow for theoretical refinements based on careful observation and justified arguments drawn from broad ranging field work and cross-cultural dialogue. 13 This claim related to cultural plurality and its implications for the account of post-secularity will be elaborated further in the following sections. How would these intellectuals begin to display the impact of post-secular attitudes within their own writings even though they would not be advocates of post-secularity?
III
What Berger and Zijderveld suggest is that a recognition of plurality -philosophically, religiously, and cultural -will be a factor which they have to contend with, so that their forms of secularism will develop to the point that worldview alternatives as well as the possibility of some kind of spiritual options may be considered that a principled secularist would generally not consider justifiable or palatable two decades earlier.
It is precisely this diversity of positions found within recent writings of academics and intellectuals related to post-secularity which have become manifest during the past decade, and they are becoming explicit in notable publications within philosophical and religious studies within contemporary Chinese contexts as well. In order to generalize from these phenomena and analyze the multiformity of these developments, we need once more to step beyond the particular circles of philosophers in mainland China and look at a much wider international and cross-disciplinary set of materials. Having done this, we will return to discuss some The second interpretive position involves those secularists who, having admitted the vitality of religious traditions, choose to participate in them as "strategic participants" while still holding relatively fast (but not necessarily so dogmatically as in the former case) to their secularist principles and biases. 17 They may attempt to offer reasons for this religious vitality, but generally find the relevant phenomena hard to interpret even though they are culturally engaged and manifest cultural influences unanticipated by secularist theories. This is to say that these persons are post-secular not only in context but also in action. Though they are not unwilling to recognize the post-secular realities around them, they do not find it easy to explain them, and so only are involved in various religious traditions or spiritualities as a matter of strategic engagement in the contemporary social contexts in which they live. We will refer to this position as strategic post-secular secularists. Under the current ideological climate it is arguably justified to claim that a growing majority of Chinese Communist cadre as well as many other humanist secularists among Chinese intellectuals fit within this category. Due to the intellectual challenges related to affirmation of international de-secularizing trends, which now are being publicly described and advocated in major Chinese books (as will be documented below), it can be expected that this dimension among Chinese intellectuals in general and among Chinese philosophers in particular will continue to grow during the coming decades. The practical reason that this can be anticipated is that this position involves the least amount of ideological adjustment while also allowing for an intellectual flexibility which will support "harmonious" attitudes and practices within de-secularizing trends in the PRC. As a consequence, it does not threaten their current status as cadres or their future retirement pensions, a matter related to life-long security which many feel may be threatened if a more explicit post-secular advocacy is adopted.
On the other hand, there are also secularists in university academies who have, like Berger, come to realize that their previous theoretical stances were inadequate, and so they have begun to readdress their theoretical positions as those "biased" by secularist values and worldviews. While they might remain secularist in orientation, they are no longer secularist in practice. That is to say, they are no longer unwilling to engage intellectual representatives of religious traditions (whether of long-standing traditions or of newly emerging religious communities), and realize that this must be done in a manner that is fair in its interactive dynamics and dialogically open.
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These may be considered mainline participants in the post-secular interpretive discourse, and display not only a tolerance generated by a self-conscious awareness of cultural pluralities (and not a secularist account of pluralism), but also a genuine sympathy for particular religious traditions. Nevertheless, unlike Berger they would not necessarily be involved as advocates for any particular religious tradition. 19 We refer to these as engaged post-secular intellectuals. Perhaps as many as half of all those teaching in religious studies programs (which still is normally found associated with philosophy departments as a subdivision within universities) and pursuing research in religious studies, along with one third of all Chinese philosophers, would currently fit into this category. If political liberalization and cultural diversity increases in the PRC during the next two to three decades, we can anticipate that this group will grow significantly in intellectual influence as well as in numbers.
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to identify any contemporary Chinese philosopher in the PRC who has experienced a major theoretical shift in intellectual and spiritual realms and has written about it as extensively and consistently as Peter Berger. In 25 This is a publication of the Institute of World Religion at the Chinese Social Sciences Academy in Beijing, and so seeks to offer a comprehensive account of both religious studies in public educational institutions as well as related studies prepared under the dictate or guidance of the Chinese Communist Party; this latter material is generally referred to as internal publications or "confidential literature" which is generally not readily available in public bookstores. 26 Nearly 700 pages in length, it offers materials in three categories: specialist essays, 27 religious studies theoretical research, 28 and studies of particular religious traditions. 29 The volume ends with the republication of government documents related to the management of religious affairs in the PRC.
From this summary of the content, one will recognize that the general overview of intellectual work in religious studies within the PRC for this designated period is sandwiched between beginning and final sections devoted to Chinese Communist policies related to religious studies and religious affairs. In addition, the initial subsections under the second and third sections begin with summaries of theoretical issues aligned with Chinese Marxist ideology, supported at times by other essays within the subsections devoted to specific religious traditions referred to as "descriptive evaluations" . 30 Of interest is the fact that they constitute almost 18 pages of articles, while the subsequent categories include nearly 90 pages of other materials on different religious topics, including specialized studies in particular religious traditions.
The most significant essay from a post-secular interpretive standpoint in the first major section of this volume is prepared by the noted religious studies scholar and major administrative figure within the Chinese Social Sciences Academy, Zhuo
Xinping 卓新平, and is entitled "On 'the Relationship Between Government and Religion' -'Globalized' Religion and Contemporary China". 31 The internal quotation marks within the title suggest that the first phrase, zheng jiao guanxi 政教关系, is a key concept within contemporary parlance in the Chinese Communist Party, and the term "globalization" (quanqiu hua 全球化) as a qualifying phrase to describe religion or religious traditions is a key concept within his analysis. Zhuo's essay is a carefully reasoned example of balancing perspectives drawn from both the strategic post-secular secularists and engaged post-secular intellectuals. Dividing his essay into four sections dealing with religion and some dimension of politics within the government, 32 he highlights the "complexity" of the current religious situation as it applies to government policy, and argues that past forms of aggressive opposition to religious traditions by the Chinese Communist Party have now been revised and sublated (using the Hegelian term, yangqi 扬弃). 33 Zhuo does so not by arguing about a major philosophical shift in party ideology, but by claiming that the European form of an aggressive atheistic critique of religions was found in practice to no longer apply in various ways to the Chinese context. In addition, he notes in the same context that the interreligious dialogues have moved away from an explicit theistic vision of religious life to one that focuses on an "ultimate reality" (zhongji shizai 终 极实在) or "eternal existence" (yongheng cunzai 永恒存在) which illustrates the plurality and relativity of religious claims. In this sense Zhuo is appealing to cadre to adopt a "strategic post-secular secularist" stance, arguing that the relativization of values in both party ideology and inter-religious engagements have transformed the Chinese cultural setting into a context where the former principled oppositions are no longer relevant.
Noting that there is an unquestionable development of religious life beyond the confines of the "five great religions" 五大宗教 or the five designated state-authorized religious traditions, Zhuo goes on to argue that the vast majority of these religious groups have no political goals or interests, and have emerged and extended among the masses in a "natural" manner. 34 As a consequence of these and other evaluations of Nevertheless, these two chapters account for less than one fifth of the whole volume, and so while the placement of these discussions in the volume undoubtedly give them the pride of place, the subsequent accounts in the rest of the volume are more varied. themes were not addressed elsewhere in the volume, it is notable that the editor obviously sought to keep a balance for all eleven sections found in the volume, so that each section was about 40 pages in length. The total length of the work is 418 pages, and so the 81 pages strictly devoted to Marxist philosophical themes is just a little less than one fifth of the tome. 40 The longest of these sections deals with "the history of Western philosophy" (46 pages), and the shortest with "Eastern philosophy" (33 pages 45 Find these sections in Chapters 7 (Mao Zedong) and Chapter 9 (Feng Youlan), as well as in the final pages of the volume where Feng employs Zhang Zai's teachings that "enemies must be resolved through harmony" (chou bi he er jie 仇必和而解) to
